given your posting history, are you the new paid Boeing astro turfer, here to support the others?
Ah yes. The old "lets datamine someones post history". Always a great response in a discussion.
given your posting history, are you the new paid Boeing astro turfer, here to support the others?
The Seattle Times article this report references has a lot more detail: https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/Reuters with a report that suggests Boeing understated the amount of power MCAS had.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-boeing-idUSKCN1QY0Q9
As Boeing hustled in 2015 to catch up to Airbus and certify its new 737 MAX, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed the agency's safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself, and to speedily approve the resulting analysis.
The safety analysis:
- Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
- Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane's nose downward.
- Assessed a failure of the system as one level below "catastrophic." But even that "hazardous" danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that's how it was designed.
Boeing insists that the pilots on the Lion Air flight should have recognized that the horizontal stabilizer was moving uncommanded, and should have responded with a standard pilot checklist procedure to handle what's called "stabilizer runaway."
If they'd done so, the pilots would have hit cutoff switches and deactivated the automatic stabilizer movement.
Boeing has pointed out that the pilots flying the same plane on the day before the crash experienced similar behavior to Flight 610 and did exactly that: They threw the stabilizer cutoff switches, regained control and continued with the rest of the flight.
However, pilots and aviation experts say that what happened on the Lion Air flight doesn't look like a standard stabilizer runaway, because that is defined as continuous uncommanded movement of the tail.
On the accident flight, the tail movement wasn't continuous; the pilots were able to counter the nose-down movement multiple times.
In addition, the MCAS altered the control column response to the stabilizer movement. Pulling back on the column normally interrupts any stabilizer nose-down movement, but with MCAS operating that control column function was disabled.
These differences certainly could have confused the Lion Air pilots as to what was going on.
Thanks for the additional info. That looks fuckin terrible.The Seattle Times article this report references has a lot more detail: https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Excerpt:
That's pretty bad. But I'm sure it was just these untrained Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots who didn't do the correct things who are at fault here.
The thing is, in theory, there is the possibility to hit a cutoff switch in case a stabilizer runaway happens. So yes, that's technically correct. The only problem with that (which is why I added the third quote) is that what actually happened didn't look like a stabilizer runaway at all to the pilots. Thus, they probably didn't know what caused this behaviour they'd never seen (or heard of) before because Boeing didn't want to mention it in the flight manual.So not only they system could make a huge correction but it would activate itself repeatedly. I wonder where is that Boeing shill who was convinced that non-American pilots are unworthy to pilot such a technology wonder.
Right, from my understanding, MCAS was not disclosed at all until at least after the LionAir crash?The thing is, in theory, there is the possibility to hit a cutoff switch in case a stabilizer runaway happens. So yes, that's technically correct. The only problem with that (which is why I added the third quote) is that what actually happened didn't look like a stabilizer runaway at all to the pilots. Thus, they probably didn't know what caused this behaviour they'd never seen (or heard of) before because Boeing didn't want to mention it in the flight manual.
Posted this in the other thread but: the planes in question have three different indicators telling pilots if there is a disagreement between the two AoA sensors, all of which are optional at an extra cost, and Lion Air had none of them. Apparently this is not mandated by the FAA as something that is required to be included.
Boeing / FAA pls.
It's weird how the more information we get, the more this story looks...exactly like how it always looked. Negligence and shortcuts in order for Boeing to cut costs and save time and be competitive with Airbus.The Seattle Times article this report references has a lot more detail: https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Excerpt:
That's pretty bad. But I'm sure it was just these untrained Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots who didn't do the correct things who are at fault here.
If it turned out that they sacrificed safety to push out the plane, I think the people responsible should be criminally charged.The Seattle Times article this report references has a lot more detail: https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
Excerpt:
That's pretty bad. But I'm sure it was just these untrained Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots who didn't do the correct things who are at fault here.
This is what I originally feared, that the MCAS runaway trim isn't readily identifiable by the pilots.The thing is, in theory, there is the possibility to hit a cutoff switch in case a stabilizer runaway happens. So yes, that's technically correct. The only problem with that (which is why I added the third quote) is that what actually happened didn't look like a stabilizer runaway at all to the pilots. Thus, they probably didn't know what caused this behaviour they'd never seen (or heard of) before because Boeing didn't want to mention it in the flight manual.
Airbus equips many of its commercial jets with its own anti-stall software that relies on an automated process.
During the Lufthansa flight in 2014, faulty information from the angle-of-attack sensors triggered the software, pushing the plane's nose down, according to German aviation investigators. The program thought the plane was nearing a stall. The captain was eventually able to override the automated system, and the pilots, after talking with a maintenance crew, identified the likely problem and continued the flight to Munich.
Investigators later found that two of the angle-of-attack sensors were blocked, probably by frozen water, and generated improper readings.
European authorities and the FAA issued airworthiness directives over several years aimed at addressing sensor problems on Airbuses.
Airbus A320 planes with certain sensors made by two companies — United Technologies, parent company of Rosemount, which makes Boeing sensors; and Sextant/Thomson — "appear to have a greater susceptibility to adverse environmental conditions" than sensors made by a third company, the FAA said.
One important difference between the Lufthansa incident and the two 737 Max accidents, aviation experts said, was where they occurred.
The Lufthansa plane was soaring at 31,000 feet when it launched into a steep dive. It dropped 4,000 feet in less than a minute before the pilots wrestled back control.
If the sensor problem had hit soon after departure, as investigators suspect it did with the Lion Air crash, that incident could have ended in disaster.
Corner cutting, underbaked risk assessments, regulatory capture. This case has it all.It's weird how the more information we get, the more this story looks...exactly like how it always looked. Negligence and shortcuts in order for Boeing to cut costs and save time and be competitive with Airbus.
Sounds like FUD here to be honest, I'm fairly sure all A320s have three AoA sensors with voting by default.Apparently this has been an issue across Airbus and Boeing models for years
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...512a6fe3439_story.html?utm_term=.1b1add9e4972
Sounds like FUD here to be honest, I'm fairly sure all A320s have three AoA sensors with voting by default.
Not saying these planes are perfect and that this would never happen, but on this particular instance there wouldn't be any correlation.
n 2014, Lufthansa Flight 1829 took off from Bilbao, Spain, and was ascending normally when the plane's nose unexpectedly dropped. The plane — an Airbus A321 with 109 passengers on board — began to fall. The co-pilot tried to raise the nose with his controls. The plane pointed down even further. He tried again. Nothing, according to a report by German investigators.
As the Lufthansa plane fell from 31,000 feet, the captain pulled back on his stick as hard as he could. The nose finally responded. But he struggled to hold the plane level.
A call to a ground crew determined the plane's angle-of-attack sensors — which detect whether the wings have enough lift to keep flying — must have been malfunctioning, causing the Airbus's anti-stall software to force the plane's nose down. The pilots turned off the problematic unit and continued the flight. Aviation authorities in Europe and the United States eventually ordered the replacement of angle-of-attack sensors on many Airbus models.
Many of the sensors include a small vane attached to the outside of a commercial aircraft. Most planes have two or three vanes as part of a redundant system. But they are not complicated machines. The Wright brothers used a version on their first flight.
Placing too much trust in the sensors also can cause trouble. One of the most serious accidents tied to angle-of-attack sensors occurred in 2008, when XL Airways Germany Flight 888T crashed into the Mediterranean Sea, killing seven people. French authorities blamed water-soaked angle-of-attack sensors on the Airbus 320 plane, saying they generated inaccurate readings and set up a chain of events that resulted in a stall.
According to investigators, the downed airplane's sensors were made by Rosemount, the same company that made the sensors on the Lion Air crash. At the time, Rosemount was also called Goodrich, the company that owned the aerospace manufacturer at the time.
WSJ:
Canada's transport minister, Marc Garneau, said Monday the government would conduct its own certification of Boeing's promised software modification to the stall-prevention system, even if it is certified by the FAA.Mr. Garneau also said Canada is reviewing its original decision in 2017 to allow 737 MAX jets to fly in that country's airspace, effectively replicating the FAA's safety approval. Canada last week grounded the plane shortly before it was idled in the U.S."We're going to review the validation that we did at that time," Mr. Garneau said in Ottawa. "We may not change anything but we've decided that it's a good idea for us to review" the decision.Such a move is highly unusual, especially for a close U.S. air-safety partner such as Canada, because governments world-wide almost always accept the decision of the country where an aircraft is manufactured. But as in the unilateral grounding of 737 MAX jets earlier this month by a host of regulators overseas, the FAA's influence regarding the MAX fleet has been waning.
Per the WaPo article, they point out it was the same combination of AoA sensor(s) going bad and autocontrols
WSJ:
Canada's transport minister, Marc Garneau, said Monday the government would conduct its own certification of Boeing's promised software modification to the stall-prevention system, even if it is certified by the FAA.Mr. Garneau also said Canada is reviewing its original decision in 2017 to allow 737 MAX jets to fly in that country's airspace, effectively replicating the FAA's safety approval. Canada last week grounded the plane shortly before it was idled in the U.S."We're going to review the validation that we did at that time," Mr. Garneau said in Ottawa. "We may not change anything but we've decided that it's a good idea for us to review" the decision.Such a move is highly unusual, especially for a close U.S. air-safety partner such as Canada, because governments world-wide almost always accept the decision of the country where an aircraft is manufactured. But as in the unilateral grounding of 737 MAX jets earlier this month by a host of regulators overseas, the FAA's influence regarding the MAX fleet has been waning.
A friend of mine did some software work at Airbus Helicopter many years ago. He said, there was someone sat behind him 100% of the time basically questioning every line of code he wrote. Nothing would come close to deployment without many eyes checking the functionality and robustness. Not to mention countless hours of virtual testing with HIL/SIL/MIL.As a software developer, I can't imagine building software that could put peoples lives at risk. Are there any interviews out there from people that work on plane software that talk about this?
I have to agree with Marin-Lune here. This sounds like grasping for straws to fuel some sort of "both sides" argument.
The Airbus incidents were caused by faulty sensors built by 3rd parties, as the article points out. The ways those incidents played out were vastly different. And apparently not threatening/common enough to ground every single a319 on the planet.
Yet, in the MAX cases, the culprit so far appears to be the software, made by Boeing, as those sensors appear to be optional - which in itself is questionable at best.
I assume this is in response to those reports stating that the FAA basically let boeing self-certify their stuff and they just put a stamp on it to make it official
see: https://arstechnica.com/information...e-risks-self-certified-much-of-planes-safety/
NYT: Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras
As the pilots of the doomed Boeing jets in Ethiopia and Indonesia fought to control their planes, they lacked two notable safety features in their cockpits.One reason: Boeing charged extra for them.For Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers, the practice of charging to upgrade a standard plane can be lucrative. Top airlines around the world must pay handsomely to have the jets they order fitted with customized add-ons.Sometimes these optional features involve aesthetics or comfort, like premium seating, fancy lighting or extra bathrooms. But other features involve communication, navigation or safety systems, and are more fundamental to the plane's operations.Many airlines, especially low-cost carriers like Indonesia's Lion Air, have opted not to buy them — and regulators don't require them.Now, in the wake of the two deadly crashes involving the same jet model, Boeing will make one of those safety features standard as part of a fix to get the planes in the air again.It is not yet known what caused the crashes of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 five months earlier, both after erratic takeoffs. But investigators are looking at whether a new software system added to avoid stalls in Boeing's 737 Max series may have been partly to blame. Faulty data from sensors on the Lion Air plane may have caused the system, known as MCAS, to malfunction, authorities investigating that crash suspect.That software system takes readings from two vanelike devices called angle of attack sensors that determine how much the plane's nose is pointing up or down relative to oncoming air. When MCAS detects that the plane is pointing up at a dangerous angle, it can automatically push down the nose of the plane in an effort to prevent the plane from stalling.Boeing's optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes, according to a person familiar with the changes, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they have not been made public. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy.Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded."They're critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install," said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. "Boeing charges for them because it can. But they're vital for safety."Earlier this week, Dennis A. Muilenburg, Boeing's chief executive, said the company was working to make the 737 Max safer."As part of our standard practice following any accident, we examine our aircraft design and operation, and when appropriate, institute product updates to further improve safety," he said in a statement.
More in the link.
Same. Probably still 100% the pilots' fault on both flights.Curious to see how the boeing defense force here will spin this
Curious to see how the boeing defense force here will spin this
Patrick Shanahan: Pentagon chief's ties to Boeing investigated
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47647865The Defence Department's inspector general will look into the matter following a complaint from a watchdog group.
Mr Shanahan is accused of frequently praising Boeing in meetings about government contracts and acquisitions.
[...]
The complaint said he had appeared to violate ethical rules by "promoting Boeing in the scope of his official duties... and disparaging the company's competitors to his subordinates".
[...]
According to the Seattle Times, the FBI is investigating the process that led to the aircraft getting its safety certification.
The US Department of Justice has refused to comment on claims that it has been looking at the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of Boeing.