samoyed I'm not really sure if anyone is interested in this, but since I have some intentions of being a religious professional, maybe it's worth presenting a take regardless. Also I suppose the revolution needs its own 'theological' discourses lol...
Regarding whether or not Buddhism is ascetic, Bhante Punnaji makes the claim that asceticism, sensuality, and the middle way, all present distinct responses to our experiences. Essentially, both denial or aversion (asceticism), and delight or clinging (sensuality), inflame the mind, while the middle way is instead the attempt to 'cool' the mind by consciously recognizing and diffusing its perturbations. So really one could say that the middle way is more like an attempt to transcend the axis through self-reflection and autonomy, while asceticism and sensuality are opposing reactive impulses towards our experiences. But this might not speak directly to how we think of asceticism and sensuality in general. I'd claim that asceticism seems to evoke a range of meanings, from the extremes of self-mortification, to the much more tepid kind of withdrawal from the world that we might otherwise call "voluntary simplicity".
So I suppose it depends what we're talking about, because monasticism certainly seems to fall into the latter category (though certainly not the former), however if we're using monasticism as our model, we can also consider it supererogatory where Buddhist discourse is concerned, in that it's just not practical or possible that every individual in the world should become a monastic and seek enlightenment. Instead, one adopts such a lifestyle because it is called for by their individual or personal commitment to self-emancipation
in its most radical or complete sense. Most Buddhists probably aren't going to engage with Buddhism as that kind of practical soteriology, and instead a lot of Buddhist discourse is about a more mundane kind of thriving (through things like generosity and harmonious social relations). However, it's the most radical stuff about enlightenment that tends to get emphasized, which I think gives people the impression that Buddhist philosophy says we should all leave our homes and go fervently meditate under a tree, when really that's only the case (and indeed one would only commit to that kind of sacrifice,) if the soteriological problem of Buddhism was the most keenly felt in one's life.
I've written a bit in the past about the relation of Buddhist philosophy and soteriology to the more Hegelian (or perhaps Marxist) conception of human thriving and our causes of suffering. They actually have far more in common than one might realize, and Hegel's own criticisms of Buddhism arguably don't really land, but without getting too into it, the exigence of enlightenment is distinct from creating just and harmonious societies that have the capacity to sustain themselves indefinitely without succumbing to their own internal contradictions. Because such a society is still conditioned or a product of circumstantiality. So while Buddhism would absolutely recognize that as a worthy aim, and perhaps even recognize it as morally necessary, it can never be a permanent state of affairs, which is to say that the world can't really be saved, it can only enter into more favourable circumstances, which isn't salvation in any sort of final or absolute sense (you could think of the paradox of progress). So basically, if you're so hardcore of an 'existentialist' that you're intent to transcend circumstantiality so as to never experience (the fear of) death or deprivation ever again, then the praxis is in part to withdraw from society and superfluous social relations, but this is because the phenomenological observation of the subtlest forms of suffering isn't really a social activity, and pursuing enlightenment perhaps requires the kind of specialization in contemplation that a more thorough social mindedness would arguably prevent.
So yeah it's pretty contextual. I think a lay Buddhist can be a Marxist or engaged in politics, 'worldliness', etc, with no contradiction whatsoever, while a monk or a nun that is essentially a 'meditation professional' cannot. Scholar monks are somewhere inbetween the two (I basically see scholar monks as the likewise academic Adorno Marxian types that say 'Y'all handle the activism, I'll handle the theoretical foundations of the movement'.) And they aren't strictly delineated, because people have different kamma and aptitudes, etc, but I'd say this is generally how these roles are or would be maintained by some kind of division of labour and/or or regard/engagement with a socialist society. There are basically different registers of Buddhist theory and praxis that are relevant in different contexts or practices, but on the whole Buddhism reserves the ability to sublate the moral exigences of socialism via the 'unconditionedness' of nibbana essentially taking you out of worldliness by definition or necessity.