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Sep 14, 2018
4,619
Will Xbox having success with cloud gaming force Sony, Nintendo, Take2, Capcom, Bandai-Namco, UbiSoft, Embracer, Square-Enix, Sega, EA, Konami, Tencent to joining their platform or are those companies incentivized to create a competing solution through partnerships? It's obviously the latter because of engagement and the world of MTX.
I mean you sound sure about it but from these companies perspective, why even attempt to compete with the first to market megacorp that already has a leg up, just put your stuff on their service. Competing is not easy and would be even less so under the circumstances that by the way might still happen without ABK. In Phil's own words, the deal is an accelerant but not necessary for their plans.
 

ThatNerdGUI

Prophet of Truth
Member
Mar 19, 2020
4,550
If Microsoft had no cloud strategy for gaming would the deal have gone through or would the argument have just changed to something else?
Most likely. Right now they claim that cloud gaming is a seperate market yet use numbers that are an extension of the console/pc market as the user base.
 

Wereroku

Member
Oct 27, 2017
6,203
Is this a possible path to over-turning the CMA? Idas Pixis KnowinStuff

There's just one TOH. It's highly speculative. It's built on an assumption of future dominance based on zero evidence, in a market they didn't even try to predict, with the addition of a vertical input which is absent from the market. The way they defined the current market to claim MS has 60%-70%, which looks like an attempt to lend weight to the future hypothetical, was questionable (ignoring Amazon Prime subs using Luna, counting GPU subs who try out xCloud the same as a paying GFN customer).

CMA assumes MS will dominate in the future and I see they and some here mentioning MS has made similar comments. Well, so did Google, and they have clear cloud strengths too. Last week, Google reported their cloud unit revenue was up 28% from a year before.

Here are Google's comments about their cloud gaming:

Feb '21: "we believe this is the best path to building Stadia into a long-term, sustainable business that helps grow the industry."
Sep '21: "gaming is an incredibly important vertical at Google."
Nov '21: "eager to continue working on bringing the best games and new features to our community of players so that we can help build a bright future for cloud gaming."
Feb '22: "The Stadia team is working really hard on a great future for Stadia and cloud gaming."

Less than a year later, it was dead.

So having strengths is no guarantee of anything. CMA even said so in the final report, but for some reason their statement only applied to Google and not MS because...?

If they can get CAT to return this to CMA with a new panel, a year may have passed. How will the cloud market have changed by then? Nvidia, Boosteroid and others should gain market share thanks to the deals MS signed with them. Sony may be dipping in. Amazon may gain share. Maybe MS upgrades xCloud from beta to a stand-alone paid service, which would crush the user numbers CMA relied on to claim 60%-70% share. A year from now MS could show cloud market share of 20% maybe.

If they can get a new panel at CMA, and especially if CMA is isolated worldwide by then as the sole regulator against it, maybe they have a shot of different people reaching a different conclusion?

This all assumes that the EC approves, that ATVI doesn't ask for too much pot sweetening in the upcoming renegotiation, that MS wants to fight, and that MS thinks there's any chance at all of winning. A lot of big ifs there.
The CMA answers you question in their paperwork. They say even if the 60-70% isn't fully correct they still believe that there is a very high probability that this deal would give MS a great deal of power. They are legally allowed to make estimations and predictions on the way the market is going to develop. Even if there is some small disputes in the underlying numbers they are still allowed to look to the future to determine a risk. I think people are focusing to much on the number estimates when everyone admits the market as it is now is not a direct correlation to how it will be then. The CMA can only be overruled if they made procedural mistakes, legal mistakes, or irrational decisions.

Most likely. Right now they claim that cloud gaming is a separate market yet use numbers that are an extension of the console/pc market as the user base.
Last I saw they were saying Cloud is going to become a separate market not that it is right now. They are looking into the future and trying to guess using the data they have been given which probably includes MS's own projections for the Cloud's growth and expansion.
 

modiz

Member
Oct 8, 2018
17,831
The CMA answers you question in their paperwork. They say even if the 60-70% isn't fully correct they still believe that there is a very high probability that this deal would give MS a great deal of power. They are legally allowed to make estimations and predictions on the way the market is going to develop. Even if there is some small disputes in the underlying numbers they are still allowed to look to the future to determine a risk. I think people are focusing to much on the number estimates when everyone admits the market as it is now is not a direct correlation to how it will be then. The CMA can only be overruled if they made procedural mistakes, legal mistakes, or irrational decisions.


Last I saw they were saying Cloud is going to become a separate market not that it is right now. They are looking into the future and trying to guess using the data they have been given which probably includes MS's own projections for the Cloud's growth and expansion.
Is there any historical examples where CAT appeal got accepted over procedural mistakes? I'm just interested to hear what kind of procedural errors could have happened. The other 2 options for an appeal just seem like dead ends imo.
 

Minthara

Freelance Market Director
Verified
Oct 25, 2017
7,903
Montreal
Is there any historical examples where CAT appeal got accepted over procedural mistakes? I'm just interested to hear what kind of procedural errors could have happened. The other 2 options for an appeal just seem like dead ends imo.

I think even procedural error is a dead end here too. Reading the CMA's response, they carefully use a lot of Microsoft's own logic, wording and data to come to their conclusion.

If they made an error it would likely not be a large one at first glance.
 

Minthara

Freelance Market Director
Verified
Oct 25, 2017
7,903
Montreal
Because that's the law and if you want to operate as a transatlantic organisation in the U.K. you have to follow the rules and regulations that goes with it.

Yup, and these kinds of huge mergers almost always have some sort of promises the companies involved have to keep or things the acquiring company must divest.

Disney/Fox, for instance, required some divestment.
 

Afrikan

Member
Oct 28, 2017
16,968
So I'm kind of lost if there actually was a remedy that approval would have happened if Microsoft sold the COD IP.

But if that were the case....

edit- I'll just save the thread some space by editing out the rest, since some have explained it has more to do than just the IP.
 
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Oct 25, 2017
12,530
It's the fact that MS owns the whole chain, as has been repeated multiple times in this thread. The problem is they own the developers, publishers, cloud tech, cloud provider and more along the chain that gives them the unfair advantage.

Blocking this deal does not change these facts about owning the whole chain (AFAIK).

The crux of my issue is how blocking or accepting the deal leads to a different outcome, and specifically what facts and sources the CMA relies upon to make the conclusion that it does.
 

Madjoki

Member
Oct 25, 2017
7,230
So I'm kind of lost if there actually was a remedy that approval would have happened if Microsoft sold the COD IP.

But if that were the case, am I the only one here who feels it would have STILL been worth it to sell the COD IP to be able to buy f'n Activision Blizzard? To go along with your ZeniMax/Bethesda acquisition? Two huge publishers under your wing.

As some know, I wasn't for the deal for other reasons... but even I feel the deal is so huge, gamers and many casuals would know that former COD devs are making a new COD-like game under Microsoft (which could still choose to sell it on various platforms, even PlayStation for the rest of this gen).

Sure a new COD would get developed by another company (and most likely Sony paying to market it), but how long do you think it would take for said company to release a new and competent Call of Duty game at the level the COD audience are used to? Where as Microsoft would have an Infinity Ward FPS War theme game ready much sooner than the competition, a game that moves and looks like the COD many know and love.

On top of 70Billion not being alot for Microsoft, wouldn't Microsoft have got good money for selling the COD IP anyway?

So that COD spiritual successor to go along with the many other Activision Blizzard IPs as true exclusives....As well as some of those studios working on Microsoft IP like Halo or Banjo, like some hoped. Seems like it would have been a good future going forward.

Or did Microsoft care about the COD IP THAT much over everything? 🤷🏾‍♂️

Most of Activision studios work on CoD and it's unlikely that IP without related studios would've been approved.
 

melodiousmowl

Member
Jan 14, 2018
3,774
CT
i was thinking, even if they got cod and cancelled it on playstation, the ship for this gen has long passed, and i don't think it would move their console sales out of a distant 3rd

keeping cod is the only smart move since down the line with brand new consoles you could attempt to leverage it, but thats just wild speculation- anything can happen in that time frame.

in any case, the only winner right now by a long shot is sony. if it had all gone through, in 5 years ms would be up from distant 3rd to close 3rd.
 

The Lord of Cereal

#REFANTAZIO SWEEP
Member
Jan 9, 2020
9,619
So I'm kind of lost if there actually was a remedy that approval would have happened if Microsoft sold the COD IP.

But if that were the case, am I the only one here who feels it would have STILL been worth it to sell the COD IP to be able to buy f'n Activision Blizzard? To go along with your ZeniMax/Bethesda acquisition? Two huge publishers under your wing.

As some know, I wasn't for the deal for other reasons... but even I feel the deal is so huge, gamers and many casuals would know that former COD devs are making a new COD-like game under Microsoft (which could still choose to sell it on various platforms, even PlayStation for the rest of this gen).

Sure a new COD would get developed by another company (and most likely Sony paying to market it), but how long do you think it would take for said company to release a new and competent Call of Duty game at the level the COD audience are used to? Where as Microsoft would have an Infinity Ward FPS War theme game ready much sooner than the competition, a game that moves and looks like the COD many know and love.

On top of 70Billion not being alot for Microsoft, wouldn't Microsoft have got good money for selling the COD IP anyway?

So that COD spiritual successor to go along with the many other Activision Blizzard IPs as true exclusives....As well as some of those studios working on Microsoft IP like Halo or Banjo, like some hoped. Seems like it would have been a good situation going forward, especially into next gen.

Or did Microsoft care about the COD IP THAT much over everything? 🤷🏾‍♂️
Because it wouldn't have been just selling the COD IP, it would have been selling the whole business that is required to make COD, which is basically every Activision studio. In this instance where they would have been required to divest COD, they basically would be buying all the non-COD Activision IPs, maybe Toys For Bob and one of the other studios depending on how much they contributed to the recent COD games, Blizzard and King.

And whoever would buy Activision in this instance would then have to also go through all the regulatory scrutiny involved with buying the largest game publisher. It would have been a whole lot of work and they believed they could skate by with behavioral remedies only
 

Wereroku

Member
Oct 27, 2017
6,203
So I'm kind of lost if there actually was a remedy that approval would have happened if Microsoft sold the COD IP.

But if that were the case, am I the only one here who feels it would have STILL been worth it to sell the COD IP to be able to buy f'n Activision Blizzard? To go along with your ZeniMax/Bethesda acquisition? Two huge publishers under your wing.

As some know, I wasn't for the deal for other reasons... but even I feel the deal is so huge, gamers and many casuals would know that former COD devs are making a new COD-like game under Microsoft (which could still choose to sell it on various platforms, even PlayStation for the rest of this gen).

Sure a new COD would get developed by another company (and most likely Sony paying to market it), but how long do you think it would take for said company to release a new and competent Call of Duty game at the level the COD audience are used to? Where as Microsoft would have an Infinity Ward FPS War theme game ready much sooner than the competition, a game that moves and looks like the COD many know and love.

On top of 70Billion not being alot for Microsoft, wouldn't Microsoft have got good money for selling the COD IP anyway?

So that COD spiritual successor to go along with the many other Activision Blizzard IPs as true exclusives....As well as some of those studios working on Microsoft IP like Halo or Banjo, like some hoped. Seems like it would have been a good situation going forward, especially into next gen.

Or did Microsoft care about the COD IP THAT much over everything? 🤷🏾‍♂️
They wouldn't have just sold the IP. Part of the divestment would require everything needed for COD to release as it did before. So any divestment of COD would have included the entire mechanism including all of the studios. That's why the second option was for the Divestment of Activision entirely. The third option was Activision and Blizzard. All of those options were included because of the fact that ABK uses resources throughout the combined company to keep COD releasing on schedule.
 

ThatNerdGUI

Prophet of Truth
Member
Mar 19, 2020
4,550
Yup, and these kinds of huge mergers almost always have some sort of promises the companies involved have to keep or things the acquiring company must divest.

Disney/Fox, for instance, required some divestment.
Because Disney would've own most if not all of the Regional Sport Networks which they sold to Bally Sports. That is a far cry of what's happening here. Even after the merger, Disney is the third in video streaming by subscribers. I'm not sure that comparison is apples to apples and if it is it does nothing to argue against this case.
 

gofreak

Member
Oct 26, 2017
7,734
Is there any historical examples where CAT appeal got accepted over procedural mistakes? I'm just interested to hear what kind of procedural errors could have happened. The other 2 options for an appeal just seem like dead ends imo.

Procedural, I think I skimmed one case where the CAT upheld an appeals ground over the CMA not giving the parties the requisite full response time after a particular report or paper. (A common refrain at this stage but it didn't go anywhere because while the CAT recognised the error it didn't think it would substantially change the outcome, so didn't send the case back)

I think MS will definitely go for irrationality on the supply shares thing. It may not go anywhere given how strongly the CMA already decoupled those calculations from their rationale, but they have to try. I haven't seen anyone highlight any other obvious possibilities yet but I'm sure Microsoft's lawyers will find some - lawyers will try any, I'd expect several grounds to be argued.

Edit - and btw, the report already has arguments between MS and the CMA over a few points of law, so actually, those are probably the starting point for appeal, MS will probably test those and others with the CAT
 
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Oct 25, 2017
17,897
I'm really curious to see how EC goes now.

We got that report saying the EC wasn't looking to block or divest, but what if MS' remedies do not satisfy them? MS was still making deals with third party cloud businesses so maybe the EC wasn't quite content still.

On top of this, the CMA's move works in the same way the FTC's move worked for the CMA before their decision. It allows the EC to avoid being the odd one out if they did think of just going toward a block instead. It can embolden them depending on how their review with all the cloud participants goes.
 

ThatNerdGUI

Prophet of Truth
Member
Mar 19, 2020
4,550
Procedural, I think I skimmed one case where the CAT upheld an appeals ground over the CMA not giving the parties the requisite full response time after a particular report or paper. (A common refrain at this stage but it didn't go anywhere because while the CAT recognised the error it didn't think it would substantially change the outcome, so didn't send the case back)

I think MS will definitely go for irrationality on the supply shares thing. It may not go everywhere given how strongly the CMA already decoupled those calculations from their rationale, but they have to try. I haven't seen anyone highlight any other obvious possibilities yet but I'm sure Microsoft's lawyers will find some - lawyers will try any, I'd expect several grounds to be argued.
And those would very likely be dependent on the EC decision in the next few weeks. If the EC approves the deal, I guess it will depend on how lenient or restrictive they remedies would be to help their argument.

I'm really curious to see how EC goes now.



We got that report saying the EC wasn't looking to block or divest, but what if MS' remedies do not satisfy them? MS was still making deals with third party cloud businesses so maybe the EC wasn't quite content still.

On top of this, the CMA's move works in the same way the FTC's move worked for the CMA before their decision. It allows the EC to avoid being the odd one out if they did think of just going toward a block instead. It can embolden them depending on how their review with all the cloud participants goes.

Except the EC wouldn't be the odd man out because the FTC, even after the CMA decision, don't really have a leg to stand on this case. I think in the end the CMA will be the odd one out.
 
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Sheepinator

Member
Jul 25, 2018
27,949
Considering Nvidia and Boosteroid coming out publicly so hard against the CMA decision, I expect they and other cloud companies will be lobbying the EC hard.
 

jelly

Banned
Oct 26, 2017
33,841
I'm really curious to see how EC goes now.

We got that report saying the EC wasn't looking to block or divest, but what if MS' remedies do not satisfy them? MS was still making deals with third party cloud businesses so maybe the EC wasn't quite content still.

On top of this, the CMA's move works in the same way the FTC's move worked for the CMA before their decision. It allows the EC to avoid being the odd one out if they did think of just going toward a block instead. It can embolden them depending on how their review with all the cloud participants goes.

I think it depends if they take the pre-emptive view like the CMA or see it how it is today and not an issue….yet so may be okay with it. I think the verticality Microsoft has will obviously be a concern much the same but now versus future, not sure the EU will see that.
 

Dave.

Member
Oct 27, 2017
6,139
is microsoft becoming a monopoly in servers with this acquisition, yes or no? the answer is no.
is microsoft becoming a monopoly in cloud gaming with this acquisition? yes or no? the answer is no.
One of the CMA's points is that yes, MS Windows does indeed stand to become a monopoly OS in cloud gaming servers, should this merger go ahead. They already command an extremely high percentage of OS use in gaming PCs, and naturally this extends to server OS for game streaming at the moment with Windows being by far the most popular choice. Google tried Linux with Stadia, which obviously worked very well technically - but was very tough to persuade developers to port to it, especially in a timely manner. Of course, then MS purchased the owner of Google's best technical partner ID, and big supporter Bethesda, and immediately took them and their support off the table.

The CMA noted that these 10 year contracts MS is throwing about specifically lock-in the use of Windows server, and the Windows version of ABK games for streaming. "They make the rival streaming services in to customers of Microsoft, not competitors". Let's say in 5 years Valve wanted to open up SteamStream, using Proton? They might well do so, but they'd have to do without access to Call Of Duty, Diablo and Overwatch - MS insists on Windows for that. In five years time, Boosteroid maybe fancies switching over to Proton in order to save some licensing fees? Too bad, blocked by the 10 year contract.

The CMA suggests ABK under Microsoft will have diminished reason to port their games to rival streaming servers than Windows Server in the future, and that ABK games skipping any potential entrant to the game streaming server OS landscape would have a much harder time gaining share with such big games certainly never being available. It's a hard point to argue against.
 

Uzuzu

Member
Nov 18, 2017
530
People keep ignoring that, again, MS owns the whole chain. If they didn't this deal would have likely passed.



It's the fact that MS owns the whole chain, as has been repeated multiple times in this thread. The problem is they own the developers, publishers, cloud tech, cloud provider and more along the chain that gives them the unfair advantage.



If MS didn't own Azure, this deal would have likely passed. But because they do, there was never really a chance of this happening.

Again, using Netflix as a great example, you can't own the whole chain, because that could give you an unfair advantage, especially if you have a history of leveraging your size and money pools to push competitors out of the market (something Slack and others complained about Microsoft doing the past few years).
Not according to the CMA. Th etheory of harm was solely based on Activision content being important to cloud gaming , and Microsoft would have an incentive to foreclose access. They stated that prior existing assets (azure/windows/infra) do not inform the theory of harm because Microsoft has those with or without ABK.

Existing assets could come into play regarding the incentives to forclose but according to the CMA the only incentive they could come up with was past behavior (only some of Microsoft games are on competing cloud services). In fact owning azure would probably make Microsoft less likely to foreclose because they would probably make more money through licensing atvi games and haveing those competitors also use infra like Azure and windows to stream. Out of all cloud competitors MS may have the least incentive to foreclose access since it would grow their cloud business.
 

Sheepinator

Member
Jul 25, 2018
27,949
Has there been any mention anywhere other than here about the insider trading in ATVI about 20 or 30 minutes before the news went public on the gov site? Someone clearly got the info first and acted on it, and it should be investigated.
 

modiz

Member
Oct 8, 2018
17,831
Has there been any mention anywhere other than here about the insider trading in ATVI about 20 or 30 minutes before the news went public on the gov site? Someone clearly got the info first and acted on it, and it should be investigated.
It was less than 10 minutes before the announcement. But I haven't seen anything since I actually noticed it and mentioned here. Definitely should be an investigation though as that was very blatant.
 

DopeyFish

Member
Oct 25, 2017
10,788
Its hard to not be when the other OS that has a huge install base doesnt take gaming seriously.

it's not that they don't take it seriously, it's that everyone is on that OS. Microsoft itself didn't take gaming on Windows seriously until like Windows 98se when 3D accelerators were a thing. MS had PC gaming locked down with DOS and they didn't really care all that much, they didn't really embrace that vision at all. But the market selected Windows just due to user base.

Hardware vendors, software makers, consumers, enterprise, etc. Lots of efforts go into Windows on all fronts that make it the monopoly it is, justified or not. So when games transition to cloud, it's natural to use all the work already done because nobody wants to fix all the edge cases all over again that happen on new OSes with differing hardware. The game will already be made for PC and ports can be expensive - why port for cloud or other OSes when you can have effectively the same footprint with just using the PC codebase for windows where a ton of work goes into customizability? Even in the case of when having a game made for Linux via PlayStation that eventually makes its way to PC, it's still easier to just use the Windows port code base.

Even that port just adds more unnecessary upkeep/ tech debt and it's not worth it to maintain.
 

ThatNerdGUI

Prophet of Truth
Member
Mar 19, 2020
4,550
One of the CMA's points is that yes, MS Windows does indeed stand to become a monopoly OS in cloud gaming servers, should this merger go ahead. They already command an extremely high percentage of OS use in gaming PCs, and naturally this extends to server OS for game streaming at the moment with Windows being by far the most popular choice. Google tried Linux with Stadia, which obviously worked very well technically - but was very tough to persuade developers to port to it, especially in a timely manner. Of course, then MS purchased the owner of Google's best technical partner ID, and big supporter Bethesda, and immediately took them and their support off the table.

The CMA noted that these 10 year contracts MS is throwing about specifically lock-in the use of Windows server, and the Windows version of ABK games for streaming. "They make the rival streaming services in to customers of Microsoft, not competitors". Let's say in 5 years Valve wanted to open up SteamStream, using Proton? They might well do so, but they'd have to do without access to Call Of Duty, Diablo and Overwatch - MS insists on Windows for that. In five years time, Boosteroid maybe fancies switching over to Proton in order to save some licensing fees? Too bad, blocked by the 10 year contract.

The CMA suggests ABK under Microsoft will have diminished reason to port their games to rival streaming servers than Windows Server in the future, and that ABK games skipping any potential entrant to the game streaming server OS landscape would have a much harder time gaining share with such big games certainly never being available. It's a hard point to argue against.
This is something that very likely won't change even with ABK being independent. There's little to no incentive for ABK to port their games to Vulkan, just like other devs on Stadia because the user base wasn't there. As for Proton, that's a lot of what ifs and speculation which are never a good legal argument.
 

modiz

Member
Oct 8, 2018
17,831
I believe the report's deadline was statutory prescribed. Could it just be people making a last minute bet?
No, it was an extremely sharp drop after the stock was stable minutes before, heck an hour earlier the pre market stock was actually positive. Just 8 minutes before the press release it suddenly dropped. There's 0 doubt there was insider trading, that or CMA released it a few minutes early somewhere.
 

Sheepinator

Member
Jul 25, 2018
27,949
It was less than 10 minutes before the announcement. But I haven't seen anything since I actually noticed it and mentioned here. Definitely should be an investigation though as that was very blatant.
That's when I happened to wake up. I figured I'd check ATVI's price, as that would be the fastest way to see what happened. When I saw it down 6% I knew either the deal was blocked or had such untenable conditions it was likely over, but I couldn't find any news yet because of course it wasn't public.

I believe the report's deadline was statutory prescribed. Could it just be people making a last minute bet?
Nope. It was a sudden sharp drop minutes before the news went public, which afaik was due some time that day. Clear leak.
 

ThatNerdGUI

Prophet of Truth
Member
Mar 19, 2020
4,550
I don't think the FTC being completely defanged to the point where they are practically unable to do their job as a regulator is a good argument as to why the CMA is wrong. Neither do I think either the ftc's or ec's decision would or should cause the CMA to 180. They can absolutely be the only one blocking this it's their right to be as it's their job to make the descision that they believe is best for the UK market.
The FTC can do their job, and their job is to follow established laws and not ideals. Now, if the law needs to change, so be it. Just because the CMA has no oversight doesn't mean they get to play world police for M&A.
 

Maledict

Member
Oct 25, 2017
4,084
The FTC can do their job, and their job is to follow established laws and not ideals. Now, if the law needs to change, so be it. Just because the CMA has no oversight doesn't mean they get to play world police for M&A.

The CMa has oversight. It operates within the boundaries set by government and is subject to judicial review on its decisions. The government is currently planning to *increase* the CMAs power with the new digital services bill.

Just because you can't pay for a hundred expensive lawyers and beat them in an open court doesn't mean they don't have oversight.
 

Dave.

Member
Oct 27, 2017
6,139
That's when I happened to wake up. I figured I'd check ATVI's price, as that would be the fastest way to see what happened. When I saw it down 6% I knew either the deal was blocked or had such untenable conditions it was likely over, but I couldn't find any news yet because of course it wasn't public.


Nope. It was a sudden sharp drop minutes before the news went public, which afaik was due some time that day. Clear leak.
Yeah the drop was super sus, I was on tradingview watching live at the time too.

If you ask me the prior week was odd too, someone seeding all these "it's definitely passing" stories pumping the price really quite a lot, right before the dump. Where did they come from? Surely the only sources weren't just Wedbush Securities (the only one I saw actually cited in these articles, but I didn't read them all)
 

Sheepinator

Member
Jul 25, 2018
27,949
If you ask me the prior week was odd too, someone seeding all these "it's definitely passing" stories pumping the price really quite a lot, right before the dump. Where did they come from? Surely the only sources weren't just Wedbush Securities (the only one I saw actually cited in these articles, but I didn't read them all)
That I consider quite normal. If it were approved, the stock would jump higher and likely never return lower, so it's normal price action imo. OTOH if it goes down, it may recover in a month or year. It is possible that some big players wanted a move up so they could sell some or hedge more though, but I doubt that was a big influence.
 

Trup1aya

Literally a train safety expert
Member
Oct 25, 2017
21,326
You know what im talking about. US Senate has final say on federal court judges at Supreme, District and Appeal level. Judges that are nominated by the President.

Sure the possibility is there, but in practice at all those judges are highly politicised and those scales those checks and balances are measured upon are heavily weighted one way or another depending on who put them in the job.

I also find the argument odd that a court, a single judge, is somehow going to come to more accurate conclusions than a panel of highly specialist M&A experts

The senate has final say on federal judge appointments, but finalists first go through independent review, and more often than not have bipartisan support.

I'm not saying that judges should replace the independent review process. I'm saying that when there's evidence of legal inaccuracies there should be system to check the executive's power. The CMA isn't perfect. They've previously made judgments that were wrong. Their preliminary findings in this particular case were not sound. Thankfully, They chose to correct them, but didn't have to... which is problematic, imo. There are critical areas within their cloud market analysis that also aren't sound. Will they correct them? Probably not.
 

Maledict

Member
Oct 25, 2017
4,084
The senate has final say on federal judge appointments, but finalists first go through independent review, and more often than not have bipartisan support.

I'm not saying that judges should replace the independent review process. I'm saying that when there's evidence of legal inaccuracies there should be system to check the executive's power. The CMA isn't perfect. They've previously made judgments that were wrong. Their preliminary findings in this particular case were not sound. Thankfully, They chose to correct them, but didn't have to... which is problematic, imo. There are critical areas within their cloud market analysis that also aren't sound. Will they correct them? Probably not.

Those sorts of issues are subject to the judicial review of the CAT though. Process, evidence, reasonableness. If Ms can show the CmA was using incorrect evidence then the CAT will grant the appeal?
 

Trup1aya

Literally a train safety expert
Member
Oct 25, 2017
21,326
People keep ignoring that, again, MS owns the whole chain. If they didn't this deal would have likely passed.



It's the fact that MS owns the whole chain, as has been repeated multiple times in this thread. The problem is they own the developers, publishers, cloud tech, cloud provider and more along the chain that gives them the unfair advantage.



If MS didn't own Azure, this deal would have likely passed. But because they do, there was never really a chance of this happening.

Again, using Netflix as a great example, you can't own the whole chain, because that could give you an unfair advantage, especially if you have a history of leveraging your size and money pools to push competitors out of the market (something Slack and others complained about Microsoft doing the past few years).

Being vertically integrated has not historically been deemed anticompetitive.

MS has the having capability to supply themselves doesn't risk monopoly power. The risk comes when MS competitors would rely too heavily on Microsoft in order to compete
 

Trup1aya

Literally a train safety expert
Member
Oct 25, 2017
21,326
Those sorts of issues are subject to the judicial review of the CAT though. Process, evidence, reasonableness. If Ms can show the CmA was using incorrect evidence then the CAT will grant the appeal?

That's just process though. When an executive is making claims of illegality that can't be proven or disproven by data, that's fundamentally open to malpractice.

When the CAT can say "those numbers you used to form your opinion were improper" then the CMA can just remove numbers from their argument and come to the same opinion based on vibes. I wouldn't say we have effective checks and balance in place.

There's a reason CMA has never reversed a ruling despite losing appeal.
 

Son of TV

Member
Jun 17, 2021
63
I'm really curious to see how EC goes now.

We got that report saying the EC wasn't looking to block or divest, but what if MS' remedies do not satisfy them? MS was still making deals with third party cloud businesses so maybe the EC wasn't quite content still.

On top of this, the CMA's move works in the same way the FTC's move worked for the CMA before their decision. It allows the EC to avoid being the odd one out if they did think of just going toward a block instead. It can embolden them depending on how their review with all the cloud participants goes.

I think the EC could end up blocking. MS is currently trying to prevent an EC antitrust investigation involving complaints in other cloud markets, from both other cloud service providers and cloud customers. Some of the complaints are even specifically about these deals MS makes gradually becoming poison pills over time. Others are about using their ownership of other parts of the chain to slowly push out competitors.
The exact fears of the CMA are happening already in more mature cloud markets.
 

LilScooby77

Member
Dec 11, 2019
11,101
That's your read on the situation. Others said before Cloud would be the issue that MS would face. Clearly the CMA laid out their reasons and found them valid and they are. Also it doesn't matter what any of us think. The decision has been made. They didn't just make it up and as I said others have shared this concern long before the ruling.

If MS failed to make the concessions the CMA wanted then it just made their decision easier lol
Not hard to make a decision when you dont have a way of being taken to court properly.
 

Son of TV

Member
Jun 17, 2021
63
Not hard to make a decision when you dont have a way of being taken to court properly.

Folks outside the US...

Is this concept of going to court to solve all problems strictly American? Is it a thing anywhere else?
Either way, the courts are no more an objective standard of decision making than an independent body. They make what are clearly the wrong decisions all the time.
The "correct" model of legal system or government isn't defined by what would have resulted in an observer's preferred outcome in this merger case.
 

LilScooby77

Member
Dec 11, 2019
11,101
Folks outside the US...

Is this concept of going to court to solve all problems strictly American? Is it a thing anywhere else?
Either way, the courts are no more an objective standard of decision making than an independent body. They make what are clearly the wrong decisions all the time.
The "correct" model of legal system or government isn't defined by what would have resulted in an observer's preferred outcome in this merger case.
If thats what you believe, sure.
 
Oct 25, 2017
12,530
Folks outside the US...

Is this concept of going to court to solve all problems strictly American? Is it a thing anywhere else?
Either way, the courts are no more an objective standard of decision making than an independent body. They make what are clearly the wrong decisions all the time.
The "correct" model of legal system or government isn't defined by what would have resulted in an observer's preferred outcome in this merger case.

Checks and balances is not a uniquely American thing. Nor is judicial review.
 
OP
OP
Idas

Idas

Antitrusting By Keyboard
Member
Mar 20, 2022
2,023
My highlights from the final report.

I know I still have dozens of questions to answer, these days I'll get back to them. But my brain is fried for the rest of the day xD

The first 320 pages are quite similar to the provisional findings, but the final report includes new relevant additions:

It looks like xCloud is mainly used to try games right now, but the CMA (and even MS) believe that it could go beyond that (page 68)

The evidence submitted by Microsoft in paragraph 5.77 suggests that currently trying games before downloading them is [REDACTED] with xCloud users. However the [REDACTED] noted in the previous paragraph also showed that only [REDACTED] of consumers who were aware cloud gaming was available on XGPU [REDACTED]. We assume respondents mentioning [REDACTED] would include those who value being able to try games before downloading it. We therefore consider this evidence suggests it is unlikely that trying games before downloading is the primary reason people are interested in cloud gaming, despite it being [REDACTED]. Nor do we think that this would be the case as cloud gaming develops. We further note that a memo from September 2022 describing priorities for Fiscal Year 2023 noted in FY22 [REDACTED], suggesting xCloud [REDACTED], and is not merely a console feature.

The CMA doesn't believe that MS is investing in cloud gaming, now and in the future, just to try games before downloading them (page 70)

Second, based on the evidence discussed in the above paragraphs, Microsoft's strategy, investment and the growth Microsoft has made in cloud gaming, we do not think it likely Microsoft has invested in cloud gaming, and will continue to do so in future [REDACTED], only so that customers can try games before they download them (ie we do not think it likely that is the sole reason). We further note in this context that Microsoft described the acquisition as supporting the opportunity to 'pivot away from the device centric strategy of the past' and 'focus instead on a consumercentric, cross-platform approach that will allow gamers to play wherever and on whatever device they wish.

The CMA expects that cloud gaming will cannibalise sales of games too (page 73)

As noted above, given the market is still developing, we also do not have real world evidence of consumer diversion between different options. However, we would expect the evidence on diversion and segmentation between B2P and MGS on console presented above to apply to cloud gaming too, given the point about cannibalising sales holds for cloud gaming too, with the additional option of BYOG—which in practice is similar to B2P for the customer, although with the flexibility to use the game across compatible platforms–not changing that assessment.

The CMA now considers that parts of ABK content will be available on subscription services; the PF didn't include the last sentence (page 86)

We are of the view that the assessment of the likelihood of Activision's content becoming available on MGS services or cloud gaming services is best carried out within the competitive assessment. For the reasons set out in our competitive assessment, we consider that absent the Merger, in the foreseeable future, Activision 'day and date' content would become available on cloud gaming services, but not on MGS services on gaming consoles, at least for Activision's most valuable games. However, we consider that Activision would likely place increasingly valuable parts of its gaming catalogue on MGS services as these services continue to grow.

According to MS, Nintendo (Switch) has a lower proportion of young gamers than Playstation and Xbox (page 101)

In response to the suggestion that Nintendo's offering is likely different to other consoles by virtue of its target audience, Microsoft submitted that Nintendo does not just target a family-friendly audience, and instead offers a broader range of 'mature' content than Xbox which are also actively marketed. Microsoft stated that several of Nintendo Switch's latest exclusives have been non 'family-friendly' games and have received mature ratings. Microsoft also submitted data showing that the distribution of gamers by age on all three consoles is similar, to further substantiate that Nintendo caters to a similar audience as Xbox and PlayStation. It also submitted that, according to the same data, on average the Switch has a lower proportion of young gamers [REDACTED] than SIE and Microsoft's consoles.

However, data shows that Switch's most popular games tend to be targeted at a family audience (page 106)

The above evidence suggests that the Switch is differentiated from PlayStation and Xbox. We note the Parties' submission above that the distribution of gamers by age on the Switch is not very different to Xbox or PlayStation. We also note that the Switch offers some content for a mature audience. However, the technical differences noted above mean that users do not generally play certain types of games on the Switch which are more popular on Xbox and PlayStation. The evidence on the extent of overlap between the titles that are popular on each of the consoles also shows that the Switch's most popular titles tend to be targeted at a family audience. We consider that family-friendly content is differentiated and may be more complementary to the other consoles' content. The same evidence also shows that the overlap between the Switch's most popular titles and the most popular titles on each of PlayStation and Xbox is low compared to the corresponding overlap between PlayStation and Xbox. Therefore, we consider that while the Switch may be a substitute to either PlayStation or Xbox for some gamers, overall it is likely to be less so.

The
YouGov survey from MS about the % of potential PS switchers didn't convince the CMA (page 135)

In the YouGov survey submitted by the Parties and described above, gamers were asked how they would have responded if the latest CoD game had not been available for PlayStation but had been available for Xbox and PC. The Parties used this data to estimate that only [REDACTED]% of all UK PlayStation gamers would switch to Xbox in response to total foreclosure of CoD.

We gave this less evidential weight than the estimates derived from the CMA survey, for the following reasons:

(a) The relevant statistic for assessing ability to foreclose is the proportion of gamers that would leave PlayStation, not just the proportion that would switch to Xbox. We are trying to capture the impact on PlayStation's competitive offering and all switching away from PlayStation is indicative of the materiality of taking CoD away.

(b) Our survey good practice guide notes that some customer sources that are used in commercial research are generally not considered sufficiently robust by the CMA for merger cases. In particular, it advises against recruiting customers from panels with non-random samples, because such panellists may have systematically different attitudes and behaviours to other customers. The YouGov panel used for the Parties' survey does not recruit its panellists in a way that meets the standards set out in the good practice guide.

(c) [REDACTED] PlayStation gamers were asked about foreclosure of CoD in the YouGov survey, compared with 1,397 in the CMA survey.


The CMA didn't consider the agreement with Nintendo as evidence that MS was interested in distributing COD to more platforms because the agreement was entered during the review process (page 186)

Regarding the Nintendo agreement, in addition to noting that this theory of harm is primarily focussed on SIE for reasons already explained, we also consider the points discussed in the ability assessment regarding the uncertainty created by certain terms of this agreement also apply to our incentive analysis. With regards to Microsoft's submission that this agreement demonstrates a general intention to distribute CoD on more consoles, we note that this agreement has been entered into during the course of our Merger investigation (and those of other authorities). We therefore do not consider this is reliable evidence of what Microsoft's incentives would otherwise be in the ordinary course.

MS considers that cloud gaming on mobile is unlikely to be common due to the increase in computational power of mobile devices (page 196)

It submitted that cloud gaming on mobile devices had been unsuccessful, citing the performance of Fortnite on xCloud as an example of difficulty in attracting and retaining gamers. It also submitted that with the increasing computational power of mobile devices, many gaming companies are increasingly developing native mobile games, meaning there is unlikely to be material demand for cloud gaming on mobile devices (which Microsoft also submitted depends on the user having a stable internet connection).

In July/August 2022, MS was discussing opportunities in VR (page 198)

Emails from [REDACTED] in July/August 2022, primarily discussing opportunities in VR, note the opportunities and Microsoft's strength in cloud. In the emails he states that he sees [REDACTED]. He also notes that in relation to Microsoft's game development studios, [REDACTED].

A cloud gaming provider reached profitability in 2022, having started in 2019; expects cloud gaming being common in a decade (page 201)

Another provider [REDACTED] submitted that it had reached profitability in 2022 having started operating in 2019, although this excludes hardware expenses. It stated that it has high capital expenditure due to hardware investments, and that a hardware solution with efficient balance between cost and performance is key to profitability in cloud gaming. This provider also stated that cloud gaming will be the main way users access gaming content in 7-10 years.

Third party publishers doesn't seem so sure about the impact of cloud gaming in the short-mid term (pages 202 - 203)

A third party publisher [REDACTED] indicated that it did not expect cloud gaming to replace console in the near future, but that it would become an alternative for some consumers. It noted that it has not yet reached mass adoption, with one of the main reasons being that it can still be associated with 'lag' or latency. It described how to replace console, cloud gaming services needed to prove that the latency question has been addressed, and that internet coverage and data plans need to improve. It stated that it is interested in developing games for cloud gaming services where the 'quality of service is there' with respect to eg latency and bandwidth, [REDACTED].

Another third party publisher [REDACTED] stated that it thought it likely that cloud gaming can support a transition away from PC and console gaming, although noting that is still an emerging technology and its development is associated with uncertainties, and it is therefore difficult to estimate approximate timescales. It described the main challenges for such a transition as mainly technical, including the requirement for low latency.

Other major third party publishers also expressed opinions about the future development of cloud gaming.

(a) [REDACTED] noted that cloud gaming is a developing technology and that if it continues to develop it will likely further increase the competitive nature of game development and benefit consumers unable to purchase the hardware for console or PC gaming. It also noted the need for stable, high-speed internet access.

(b) [REDACTED] stated that cloud gaming is still nascent, and cloud gaming service providers are currently in the early adopter stage. It noted that in deciding whether to publish on a cloud gaming service it would, among other things, evaluate whether it has the capacity to provide users with a good gaming experience. It also noted that it has published games on GFN and xCloud.

(c) [REDACTED] described cloud gaming as still nascent. It stated that it would consider the in-game player experience including latency when evaluating opportunities to publish a game on a cloud gaming service, and has published a select number of games on GFN, xCloud and Stadia. It also stated that it thinks cloud gaming offers one possible route to device agnostic gaming in the future.

(d) [REDACTED] stated that is likely that cloud gaming services will grow especially in markets with free fast internet access and low console penetration. It noted that in the UK 'machine gaming' (ie on console or PC) is most popular as there is no latency. It described cloud gaming as being early in its life cycle, and that as a rough guess it could be 10-15 years before cloud gaming replaces consoles.

(e) [REDACTED] stated that it did not think it was likely that cloud gaming would overtake console gaming in the next five years due to latency concerns. It however stated that it did anticipate that cloud gaming will be a viable alternative to native devices in major markets within five years.


A cloud infrastructure provider thought that the closing of Stadia left "a sizeable hole in market share and performance" (page 204)

[REDACTED] stated that the closing of Google Stadia will 'leave a sizable hole not only in market share but also in regard to performance' and noted that the market is 'searching for someone else' as Microsoft and SIE do not wholly focus on cloud gaming. It stated that whilst many believe cloud gaming is the future, until cloud infrastructure and business models catch up, similar failures of cloud gaming services will continue to happen.

The CMA believes that although mobile devices may increase in computational power, cloud hardware wil continue to be more powerful (page 206)

With respect to the Parties' argument that the increasing computational power of mobile devices will limit the growth of cloud gaming, we note that, whilst the computational power of mobile devices has increased and may continue to increase, cloud infrastructure and hardware will continue to be more powerful with more memory, and therefore offer higher performance gaming. In the same way that there will continue to be demand for consoles and gaming PCs which are able to offer higher performance gaming than smaller, handheld devices, there is likely to continue to be demand for cloud gaming which can also offer higher performance from hardware housed in data centres. Playing via cloud also offers additional benefits such as using less battery life as less processing is happening locally.

The CMA contacted Shadow, Utomik, Playkey, Netboom, and Blacknut to get data but didn't get a response (page 214)

In the course of the investigation, we contacted Shadow, Utomik, Playkey, Netboom, and Blacknut, with a view to obtaining MAU data to calculate shares of supply, but were unable to obtain this information. We do not expect that data for these providers would make a significant difference to our calculated shares of supply, as they have not been mentioned by any other market participants as significant suppliers, so we expect them to be small. They are also not included in any shares of supply estimates from the Parties or third parties.

MS didn't agree with the shares in the cloud gaming market (60-70%) because it's not a standalone cloud gaming service. However, the CMA believes that a significant proportion of Game Pass Ultimate users are attracted to it due to cloud gaming and that they would be willing to pay extra for it (page 216 - 217)

The Parties submitted that shares of supply analysis is misleading and overstates Microsoft's strength as [REDACTED], and it is therefore not comparable to standalone cloud gaming services such as GFN. Whilst it is not possible to determine how many users xCloud would have as a standalone service, the evidence described above indicates that cloud gaming attracts users to XGPU and that a significant proportion ([REDACTED]%) of users would be willing to pay extra for it, even though they already have access to offline play, which suggests for those customers, streaming and offline play are not substitutes, and these customers may be interested in cloud gaming as a standalone service (although we recognise that it is difficult to fully separate Microsoft's ability to 'upsell' xCloud to Game Pass customers from Microsoft's ability to compete for stand-alone xCloud customers). In any case our concern is about Microsoft's future position based on our assessment of its strength, and its substantial number of users now indicates that it may continue to attract a large number of users as cloud gaming grows.

The CMA believes that MS has an advantage due to the compatibility of Xbox games, Xbox OS and xCloud, avoiding additional development work for streaming (page 222)

The Xbox OS also has a large library of compatible games and, in particular, the full range of games that Microsoft already uses to support the Xbox console business. Data provided by Microsoft indicates that [REDACTED] games are playable on Xbox Series X (which runs Xbox OS). This has allowed Microsoft to set up cloud infrastructure using Xbox consoles running Xbox OS in a quick and low-cost way, whilst maintaining access to a large library of games. This is discussed in more detail in the next section. Microsoft has submitted that [REDACTED] and therefore does not gain an advantage from this library of games. However, in our view the advantage still arises because, where a game is already compatible with Xbox OS, there is no additional development work or porting required to make the game available on xCloud, reducing the cost of making games available for streaming.

The CMA believes that only MS has a short term - lower cost hardware solution (xCloud) and a large one (Azure) for cloud gaming (page 236)

Some rivals have their own cloud infrastructure solution. [REDACTED]. Only Microsoft has a short-term, lower cost hardware option in the form of console infrastructure, and a large cloud infrastructure network that can enable it to efficiently scale its service as cloud gaming grows.


The CMA believes that Activision's stance on cloud gaming is positive, in general (page 255)

Overall, we consider that Activision's stance on cloud gaming as emerging from these documents is positive. This is despite some documents pointing towards scepticism from [REDACTED] to partnerships with cloud gaming providers, [REDACTED]. In particular, as we assess below, we have seen evidence of Activision, including Activision's senior leadership and [REDACTED], actively discussing potential opportunities with cloud gaming providers in the last three years.

According to the CMA, cloud gaming has been able to grow without ABK's content but it doesn't mean that limiting access to it couldn't harm the market (page 266)

We disagree with Microsoft that there is any logical inconsistency between the counterfactual and importance of Activision content. The withdrawal of an important input could harm a competitor's competitiveness without causing it to become so unprofitable such that it goes out of business or impact the growth potential of the industry without eliminating any growth potential whatsoever. Cloud gaming exists today and has grown without Activision content and is projected to grow further, but it is still possible that i) it could grow more rapidly if Activision content is widely available across the market absent the Merger, and ii) limiting access to Activision content post-Merger could seriously harm rivals' competitiveness in circumstances where rivals could have had widespread access to Activision content absent the Merger.

The CMA didn't place any material weight on the agreements with NVIDIA, Boosteroid and Ubitus due to some of the provisions included, among other issues (pages 282 - 283)

In relation to the specific terms of these agreements, we note that Microsoft has specifically acknowledged a degree of uncertainty in respect of the future development of each contract by including an [REDACTED] clause, which broadly sets out that [REDACTED].

As well as demonstrating the difficulty of contracts adequately allowing for different circumstances that could arise in a dynamic and growing market, we consider this demonstrates the difficulties in placing any material weight on contracts being able to constrain an ability to foreclose that otherwise exists, where bargaining power in the event of such renegotiation or any related disputes would not be equal. Further, in all three agreements, [REDACTED].

We note further uncertainty arising from the terms of these agreements through [REDACTED] provisions. For example, the Boosteroid and Ubitus agreements each contain a provision allowing Microsoft to [REDACTED]. It is not clear the extent to which such [REDACTED] may arise, although the fact that this provision has been included in these agreements indicates that Microsoft sees this as a material risk.

In any case, we note that Microsoft has entered into contracts with three cloud gaming providers, who either have a BYOG model (NVIDIA, Boosteroid) or a B2B focus (Ubitus). We are assessing here whether the Merged Entity would have the ability to use Activision's games to foreclose cloud gaming service rivals in general, not limited to any specific rivals. In the context of a nascent and growing market, we cannot be confident that agreements with a limited number of providers remove the Merged Entity's ability to foreclose in the cloud gaming services market more generally. This is the case even in circumstances where cloud gaming providers with agreements in place consider that any concerns they have are now resolved – as their incentives are to ensure access to content for their own business, rather than ensuring competition across the market more generally.

Accordingly, while we recognise that these agreements may provide NVIDIA, Boosteroid and Ubitus with some level of a protection against foreclosure to some extent, given the uncertainty flowing from the terms of these agreements which relate only to three cloud gaming providers, we do not consider it appropriate to place any material weight on these agreements in the overall assessment of the Merged Entity's ability to foreclose its cloud gaming service rivals.


Signing the agreements with NVIDIA, Boosteroid and Ubitus while the review process was still going on, could just be a short term incentive for MS, according to the CMA (page 293)

In respect of Microsoft's submission that the agreements prove conclusively that Microsoft is incentivised to distribute Activision content widely, we consider it is relevant that these agreements were entered into in the context of an ongoing merger review process. We consider that Microsoft entering into these agreements does not provide us with reliable evidence regarding its incentives in the same way as other past behaviour which is separate to the Merger and Merger review process, or our general analysis of the Merged Entity's incentives above. Accordingly, we do not consider the fact that Microsoft has entered into these agreements undermines our findings on its post-Merger incentives. Microsoft may have short-term incentives to enter into these agreements to seek to address the competition concerns arising from the Merger, but this is not informative of its longer-term commercial incentives.

Boosteroid expects to reach 100 million MAUs by 2026 (page 298)

Boosteroid submitted that it intends to reach 100 million MAUs by 2026. This is expected to be primarily due to [REDACTED].

Costs of developing AAA games are skyrocketing, including development and marketing, seasonal updates are also affected (pages 309 - 310)

A report by IDG submitted by a third party [REDACTED] dated August 2021 notes that development budgets are reaching unprecedented ranges.

The report observes that while 5 years ago most AAA console/PC releases had development budgets between $50-150 million, on average, games that are greenlit today, with a potential release in 2024-2025, are being approved for development budgets of $200 million or higher. Also, the report says that some AAA franchises like CoD have development budgets already exceeding $300 million, and the next GTA and other future tent-poles are also expected to hit $250 million or higher.

Activision is also quoted in this report saying with reference to CoD: 'We have to make so much content for Call of Duty, that we can't even lean on one lead studio anymore. Now we need almost 1.5 lead studios for each annual CoD. That kind of bandwidth pressure is forcing us to use outsourcers more and more. I don't see that changing anytime soon.'

The above figures are consistent with submissions we received from other third parties. For instance:

(a) A publisher [REDACTED] mentioned that the overall figures for development and marketing costs for major brands and their recent instalments are approximately Euro 150 million for pre-launch development costs and approximately Euro 50 million for launch marketing campaign costs.

(b) Another publisher [REDACTED] reported development costs for its major AAA franchises ranging between more than $80 million to almost $350 million per title, and marketing costs reaching up to $310 million depending on the franchise.

(c) We received similar ranges from an additional publisher [REDACTED]. Specifically, it reported a total of development and marketing costs between about $110 million and almost $380 million for some of its latest major releases.

(d) A fourth publisher [REDACTED] submitted that the costs related to developing and regularly releasing new titles can vary significantly depending on the game type or business model of a particular studio. It provided an example that for one AAA game the development budget value could range between $90 million and $180 million, whereas the marketing budget could range between $50 million and $150 million. This publisher also submitted that for one of its major franchise's development costs reached $660 million and marketing costs peaked at almost $550 million.

(e) Finally, another publisher [REDACTED] estimated that its development costs for seasonal updates for one of its first party titles range from approximately $50 million to $65 million.


Activision uses 15 outsourcing/co-development partners for a $100 million game, and 20- 30 different partners for a larger game (page 315)

Also, as noted above, a report by IDG submitted by a third party [REDACTED] quoted Activision Blizzard as saying that it has so much content for CoD that it needs almost 1.5 lead studios for each annual CoD. Further, Activision is claimed in the report to have said that it typically uses about 15 outsourcing/co-development partners for a $100 million game, and 20- 30 different partners for a larger game.

The remedies working paper was issued on March 24th (the same day the addendum to the PF was published), not in early April as speculated (page 330)

On 24 March 2023, we notified the Parties of the Addendum to the Provisional Findings in which we set out our provisional view that additional evidence received since the publication of our Provisional Findings meant that we considered there to be only one provisional SLC, ie in cloud gaming services in the UK. On the same date, we shared a working paper with the Parties (the Remedies Working Paper), which set out our provisional decision that prohibition of the Merger would be the only effective and proportionate remedy to the provisional SLC in cloud gaming services based on our consideration of the written and oral responses received from Microsoft, Activision and third parties following the Remedies Notice.

Prohibition of the merger also means that MS and ABK won't be able to try again for the next 10 years (page 336)

Prohibition would be effected by accepting undertakings under section 82 of the Act or making an order under section 84 of the Act, prohibiting the Merger and preventing the Parties from attempting to merge for a further period: our normal practice would be to prevent a future merger between the Parties for the next ten years, absent a change of circumstances.

MS thought that prohibiting the merger would preserve the status quo of Sony and Google (page 337)

Further, Microsoft submitted that the 'two key complainants' against the deal (SIE and Google) have many reasons to preserve the status quo or undermine the Merger in order to extract higher profits to the detriment of game developers and gamers. It submitted that, on this basis, the Microsoft Cloud Remedy protects competition in a way that prohibition will not. Microsoft submitted that 'through prohibition, the CMA is ensuring the ongoing success of entrenched competitors who have no incentive to expand competition'.

A third party thought that prohibiting the merger could risk ABK entering into a long term exclusivity deal with MS (page 337)

One third party ([REDACTED]) told us that prohibition would not be an effective remedy because it disagreed with the SLC finding, and that blocking the Merger could risk Activision entering into long-term exclusivity deals with Microsoft which would have the same effect, in its view, as divestiture of the CoD franchise. Another third party ([REDACTED]) commented that prohibition would be 'detrimental' for the growth of cloud gaming and [REDACTED] players as they would not have access to the CoD title.

MS and ABK quickly dismissed the option of divestment, although the CMA was interested in assessing it in more detail ( 339 - 340)

Some third parties told us that a partial divestiture option had the potential to be effective.

Other third parties told us that partial divestiture would involve effectiveness risks relating to scope and composition of the divestiture package, availability of a suitable purchaser, shared intellectual property (IP) assets and other development resources. One third party told us that it could not see how partial divestiture could be better for competition and for gamers than the Merger completing. SIE told us that a partial divestiture remedy would be effective if the divested entity was able to compete viably, on a standalone basis, and without the support of those parts of Activision's business that remain with Microsoft (eg the King business).

However, Microsoft told us that any partial divestiture scenario would be [REDACTED]. Activision acknowledged Microsoft's position on partial divestiture, noting its understanding that [REDACTED].

Given our initial risk assessment, we consider that substantial additional evidence would be required from the Parties to enable us to assess whether the divestiture of part of Activision would, in practice, represent an effective remedy. We explained to the Parties that, without additional evidence from them, we would be unlikely to be able to conclude whether a partial divestiture is an effective remedy.


MS accused again the CMA to rely on evidence from a third party that refused to hold any discussions with them (Sony, I guess) (page 348)

In its response to our Remedies Working Paper, in relation to the CMA's broader concern that, under the Microsoft Cloud Remedy, there may be a variety of ways in which user experience might worsen on competing platforms even with some form of licensing remedy in place, Microsoft told us that there was no basis for this concern as the titles which would be available for streaming would be the same which are available to purchase from the Microsoft Game Store or another Authorised Game Store on a royalty-free basis. Moreover, it told us that Microsoft was offering streaming rights in relation to titles irrespective of whether Microsoft itself decides to stream the titles. It added that the CMA relied on evidence from one third party ([REDACTED]) that had consistently refused to hold any discussions with Microsoft in order to address its concerns, and noted that the concerns raised have been rejected by the CMA in relation to console gaming. It told us that the Provisional Findings also presented no evidence to suggest that partial foreclosure of Activision content could foreclose cloud gaming rivals.

According to MS, the cloud remedy wasn't limited to B2P and BYOG (page 349)

Microsoft submitted that the Microsoft Cloud Remedy is not limited in scope to BYOG and B2P. It told us that the definition of Streaming Service includes all business models, including MGS. It submitted that it is sufficient that MGS is treated in the same way as other potential business models and submitted its view that we have presented no evidence to suggest that Activision would have contemplated placing its content on a MGS cloud gaming service. It submitted that we have not found Activision content to be an important input for MGS. Microsoft submitted that the evidence is limited to CoD and that WoW is only 'notable'. It told us that the fact that future games may have been placed on cloud services in the future does not mean that they would be an important input. Microsoft submitted that the Provisional Findings are consistent with MGS growing without access to Activision titles and that the CMA ruled out the concept of Activision content playing a role in the growth of cloud gaming MGS. On this basis, Microsoft submitted that this cannot be seen as a distortion. Further, Microsoft submitted that it would be disproportionate and unnecessary for the scope of the remedy to include a commitment to make Eligible Games available via MGS in order to address the SLC identified by the CMA.

The remedies offered to the CMA were different to the the ones offered to the EC (page 351)

Microsoft told us that the revised details of the Microsoft Cloud Remedy set out in its response to the Remedies Working Paper were consistent with the revised remedy proposal which had been put forward to the European Commission, but that Microsoft's proposal to the CMA went beyond the proposed commitments to the European Commission in certain respects in order to address the CMA's specific concerns set out in the Remedies Working Paper.

Multiples third parties weren't happy with the MS cloud remedy proposal (pages 350 - 357)

This third party told us that the user experience for Activision Blizzard content could be degraded by:

(a) Microsoft limiting the availability of Activision Blizzard content on consoles and cloud gaming services platforms (particularly for new types of consoles and cloud gaming services platforms);

(b) content exclusivity by offering lower quality options (such as not having access to features, upgrades, expansion packs, bonus content, or ingame content such as skins or weapons) for Activision Blizzard content on other consoles and cloud gaming service platforms;

(c) timed exclusivity by delaying new versions, updates, content packages, or in-game content for Activision Blizzard titles from appearing on other consoles and cloud gaming platforms at the same time as on Microsoft devices;

(d) experience degradation on rival platforms by delaying and failing to complete bug testing and remediation; having lower quality customer responses; degrading key gaming qualities such as high-end graphics and auto-saving reliability; increasing gameplay latency or deprioritising latency issues; ignoring or deprioritising form factor and other user experience changes needed to optimise game content; and impeding gameplay matchmaking services; and

(e) discriminatory pricing and terms by raising prices for Activision Blizzard content on other console or cloud gaming platforms or otherwise applying less favourable terms and conditions to users accessing that content on non-Microsoft platforms

Another third party told us that the revised Microsoft Cloud Remedy was 'inadequate and insufficient' for the following reasons:

(a) the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy does not contain an obligation on Microsoft to license the Activision games – in order to remedy the concern that Microsoft has an incentive to withhold Activision content from distributors of games via cloud game streaming services, Microsoft should be required to ensure that all such distributors of games, including stores that sell games to be streamed via the cloud, such as PlayStation Plus, Amazon Luna, and (before it closed) Stadia, have access to such content on fair, reasonable, and non- discriminatory terms;

(b) the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy does not require Microsoft to license Activision content to distributors of games via cloud gaming streaming services – this third party told us that Microsoft's obligations arise only where a consumer has secured a licence to play Activision games and wants to stream that game on a third-party cloud streaming service. It added that operators that do not secure a licence to Activision games would be foreclosed. This third party told us that, accordingly, should Microsoft decide not to license Activision games, the only cloud streaming services that would benefit from the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy would be BYOG services, such as NVIDIA, which rely on consumers buying games elsewhere. It added that even then, the way in which the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy had been structured, make it highly unlikely that even BYOG operators would benefit;

(c) the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy does not remedy other 'significant defects' in the original Microsoft Cloud Remedy, in particular:

(i) first, the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy would entitle Microsoft to retain all revenue from sales of Activision games, in-app purchases, and any other future game-related transactional revenues – as a result, cloud game streaming services would not become rivals to Microsoft's Game Pass Ultimate, but rather, they would become Microsoft's customers, with only the ability to stream Activision games and send all the associated revenues to Microsoft. This third party told us that this would be unattractive for any cloud game streaming service, including BYOG operators like NVIDIA, which are the only [] submission to the CMA. operators that would benefit from the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy should Microsoft decide not to license Activision games;

(ii) second, the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy does not include any quality, content, or technical parity obligations, and therefore, Microsoft could release Activision content to rival cloud streaming service at a lower level of quality or with features or upgrades only available to its own service;

(iii) third, the duration of the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy is too short – given the nascency of cloud game streaming, a ten-year duration is insufficient to enable alternative cloud game streaming services to establish themselves as credible competitors to Microsoft in this nascent space; and

(iv) fourth, the modified Microsoft Cloud Remedy still does not allow for swift redress. In this regard, this third party told us that the 'Fast-Track Dispute Resolution' mechanism is long and burdensome and would, at best, enable redress around one year after a licensee had become aware of a potential breach. It added that in the meantime, the licensee would have suffered irreparable harm, 'as the market would tip further to Microsoft'. Therefore, this third party considered that swift and effective redress was essential for any access commitment of this kind.


Regarding the revenue model of licensed games, the MS cloud remedy remains silent about it, that's why one third party thought that MS could be entitled to 100% of all the revenue from sales (page 356)

It added that the Microsoft Cloud Remedy was silent on the revenue share split between Microsoft and eligible providers of cloud gaming services, and that if Microsoft proposed to keep all revenues, eligible providers of cloud gaming services could not recoup costs associated with including Activision content on their services, still less generate any margin from distributing Activision content. Moreover, this third party told us that the Microsoft Cloud Remedy risked forcing the market to develop via PC game storefronts as opposed to other types of business models that cloud gaming service providers might have otherwise developed, given that they were 'open to exploring different ways of monetising their services' and their 'current business models were not fixed'.

The CMA believes that the cloud remedy does not cover alternative business models (page 362)

The design of the remedy does not make any provision for a direct commercial relationship between the cloud gaming service and the publisher of the Eligible Games (ie Activision). This limitation of the remedy restricts the ability of the cloud gaming service to employ competitive strategies and business models that we currently observe in the cloud gaming market, and other strategies which might also be seen in the future in the absence of the Merger. Such strategies and business models include, but are not limited to, joint marketing arrangements, negotiation with games publishers to provide exclusive or early access content (both of which are current features of Activision's commercial relationship with SIE) or to provide competitive differentiation around game access or content, and MGS deals (such as Amazon's deal with Ubisoft).

In its response to the Remedies Working Paper, Microsoft told us that there was no requirement for the Consumer Licence to be paid for, and that the definition of the licence does not specify the type of payment. It gave an example, that 'if a player is entitled to play an Eligible Game via a subscription service that player is paying for, that player also has the right to play that game via an Eligible Streaming Service'.

We do not consider that this example demonstrates how the remedy effectively addresses alternative business models to BYOG, such as subscription services. In particular, it is not clear how a consumer would gain the entitlement to play an Eligible Game via a subscription service. In this example, the consumer would not necessarily have obtained a Consumer Licence to stream, as they would not have purchased a copy of the game. This would suggest that the consumer's entitlement would derive from their relationship with the cloud gaming service providing the subscription. In turn, this would mean that the cloud gaming service would need to have a licence from, or some other contract with, Microsoft to allow it to include the Eligible Games in its subscription service.


The cloud remedy does not cover non-Windows OS, according to the CMA (page 364)

The Microsoft Cloud Remedy applies only to the PC and console versions of a defined list of games (the Eligible Games). The PC versions are those which are developed to run on a Windows OS.

This means that any cloud gaming service wishing to stream these games would have to use, or be compatible with, the Windows OS version of those games. This would exclude or restrict providers that may wish to provide cloud gaming services using other OSs, either now or in the future. This could exclude, for example, Apple, which has its own proprietary OS, as well as Linux OS-based cloud gaming services and potential new entrants using a different OS. We have found that Microsoft would have the ability and incentive to foreclose rival cloud gaming service providers post-Merger.

This means that cloud gaming services using other OSs would either need to switch to Windows (and incur Windows licensing fees, which we found to be a high proportion of overall costs for cloud gaming providers) or seek to adapt the Windows version of the game to run on their alternative OS (eg through the use of a compatibility layer such as Proton, which we have already found is not sufficiently effective to overcome Microsoft's advantage through Windows). This has the potential to make it significantly more difficult for such providers to enter, grow and compete against Microsoft.

In response to these concerns, Microsoft told us that it would grant streaming rights for MacOS and other PC OS versions of the Eligible Games 'as may be released during the term of the Microsoft Cloud Remedy'. It noted that Activision had previously released MacOS versions of a small number of games.

While this commitment brings non-Windows PC versions within the scope of the Microsoft Cloud Remedy, it only covers games for which Microsoft chooses to make alternative versions. In the absence of the Merger, Activision would seek to maximise the value that it was able to derive from these games, which would have involved consideration of making nonWindows PC versions of its games (as it already has done in some cases). In our view, it is likely that Activision would continue to develop non-Windows PC versions of at least some of its games absent the Merger, and the incentives to do so would increase if demand for cloud gaming services that use PC operating systems other than Windows were to grow.


The cloud remedy also covered Playstation versions of the eligible games (page 366)

The Cloud Remedy also covers PlayStation versions of the Eligible Games. We considered whether Microsoft could foreclose SIE's cloud gaming service by making the PlayStation version of the game less attractive than the Xbox or PC streamed versions.

The cloud remedy is not long enough (page 367)

The Microsoft Cloud Remedy has a duration of ten years. We note that some third parties told us that this was a sufficient duration to remedy the SLC. However, the SLC in cloud gaming services that we have found arises from a structural change in the market. As a result, the SLC and the adverse effects arising from it are not time limited and could endure beyond ten years. Although we recognise the possibility that the changing nature of the market might result in circumstances where the SLC may no longer apply, we do not have a high degree of confidence in such an outcome. While the Consumer and Streaming Provider Licences are perpetual, the other protections and commitments of the remedy, including monitoring and enforcement, would expire after ten years, leaving it materially weaker.

Our view is that the time-limited nature of the Microsoft Cloud Remedy is a clear and further weakness in terms of its effectiveness as a comprehensive solution to the SLC. While the duration of the remedy could be extended, or the end-date removed, this would create additional risks in terms of specification in the context of obsolescence and/or distortion of the market, and in terms of effective monitoring.

The cloud remedy is too complex (page 368)

The Microsoft Cloud Remedy does not affect a single party, but instead represents a set of commitments that would be open to any eligible cloud gaming service.

However, it is a complex remedy involving Microsoft committing to develop and maintain commercial and technological relationships with competing cloud gaming services and game storefronts. Furthermore, it requires third-party arbitration, monitoring and enforcement, with the functions of these third parties and the CMA needing to be fully defined and established.


No one can predict the evolution of the cloud gaming market: the CMA, MS, ABK or third parties (page 368)

Cloud gaming is an early-stage and growing dynamic market, and there is considerable uncertainty as to how it will develop and what competing business models will emerge. We believe, for the reasons set out in detail in Chapter 8, that foreclosure of Microsoft's rivals in cloud gaming services may be expected to result in substantial harm to competition in this market. We recognise that we cannot predict with any certainty how exactly the market might evolve absent the Merger (or if the Merger is allowed to proceed on the basis of the Microsoft Cloud Remedy). Neither, in our view, can the Parties or third parties. We consider this represents an inherent specification risk in the Microsoft Cloud Remedy – even if the remedy could be well-specified to cover the current status of the market, it may not be suited to future changes. This means that we cannot have a high degree of confidence that the terms of the remedy would be sufficiently well-specified to address these unpredictable market changes.

The cloud remedy is hard to monitor (page 371)

The remedy essentially proposes that the CMA would oversee various arrangements that seek to regulate the behaviour of global firms in a complex technological sector that is subject to rapid growth, evolving business models and changing commercial practices. Notwithstanding the appointment of a Monitoring Trustee, the Microsoft Cloud Remedy is likely to place significant demands on CMA resources for the duration of its proposed term, principally through the CMA's extensive monitoring and enforcement responsibilities across the broad scope of the remedy, its oversight and governance of the Monitoring Trustee and any of its advisers, and its participation in any dispute resolution process.

(c) The Microsoft Cloud Remedy requires the interaction of a number of third parties and processes (eg Microsoft's Compliance Director, reporting requirements, Monitoring Trustee, third party dispute resolution), each contributing to the monitoring and enforcement of the remedy. While there is a need for the involvement of these different parties, the resulting organisational complexity creates an additional challenge in ensuring that the Microsoft Cloud Remedy is monitored and enforced effectively in the longer-term.


A third party (very likely Sony) would consider to add its own first party games on its subscription service if MS were to offer COD on Game Pass (page 376)

One third party ([REDACTED]) told us that any behavioural commitment from Microsoft to grant rivals access to CoD could pose a risk for consumers, as there are numerous ways Microsoft could withhold or degrade access which would be 'extremely difficult to monitor and police'.

The same third party also told us that adding CoD to Game Pass would be a 'good thing' for existing Game Pass subscribers who play CoD, but that a larger population of [REDACTED] gamers would suffer due to the foreclosure strategies Microsoft could engage in. This third party told us that it would have to consider adding its own first-party content day and date on its subscription platform if Microsoft were to offer CoD day and date on Game Pass, but that doing so would diminish its incentives to invest in its first-party content and would not be good for its gamers.


One third party questioned the validity of the "additional 150 million gamers worldwide" (page 377)

Second, this third party told us that while Microsoft claimed that its partnership with NVIDIA and Nintendo would bring CoD to 'an additional 150 million gamers worldwide', it told us that to derive the 150 million figure, Microsoft had summed Nintendo's entire installed base (around 123 million) and all existing GeForce Now subscribers (around 20 million). However, this third party told us that according to Ampere Analysis, only 2 million of GeForce Now's 20 million subscribers were paid members, and Microsoft was silent on whether CoD would become available to the 18 million free members. This third party also told us that it would not be 'economically sound' for Microsoft to make CoD available to trial subscribers with free accounts when tens of millions of avid fans were willing to pay $70 to buy the latest game.

COD could make Nintendo (Switch) a closer competitor to Xbox (page 389)

We have concluded in Chapter 7 that Microsoft would not have the incentive to foreclose rival console gaming services in the UK. However, this is not determinative of whether Microsoft has a commercial incentive to develop and publish native CoD titles for Nintendo. This would involve substantial costs that would need to be recouped through additional sales of native versions of CoD on Nintendo. In addition, placing valuable CoD content on Nintendo would in principle increase diversion away from Xbox and towards Nintendo. While this effect may be relatively limited given our findings in Chapter 7 that Nintendo competes less closely with Xbox, making CoD on Nintendo could make it a closer competitor to Xbox, which we consider would not be in Microsoft's interest. The Parties have not provided us with convincing evidence of the expected costs, revenues and profitability that might inform an assessment of Microsoft's commercial incentives in this respect.

Predicting the evolution of COD and customer behaviour in ten years is hard (page 391)

The agreement has a ten-year term. We consider that account must be made for the inherent uncertainty over the scale of the benefits over time. The likelihood of the assumptions remaining constant will decrease over time, and the changing nature of the console market makes it harder to make any predictions about how a particular retail product (for example, CoD [REDACTED]) might evolve, or how customer behaviour might develop. As such, it is not a reasonable assumption that any annual benefit would remain constant over the term of the agreement. Instead, in our view the benefits are likely to decline significantly (and certainly at a rate greater than the 'risk-free' rate used in Microsoft's NPV calculation) over time, reducing our confidence that they can be expected to be realised.

MS has tried to buy at least one mobile games publisher (page 394)

We note Microsoft's submission that Activision has significant strength in mobile gaming, and consider that the presence of Activision's games on any mobile gaming store would enhance its competitiveness. However, we also consider that this could be achieved by less anti-competitive means than the Merger, and Microsoft could acquire 'attractive content and experience with player engagement and acquisition' by buying a different mobile games publisher. This appears to have been Microsoft's strategy – it attempted to buy [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], and said [REDACTED].

Call of Duty wasn't coming to Game Pass until 2025 (page 397)

On this basis, we would expect that the benefits would start to accrue within a reasonable period (although there would, in practice, likely be some delay between completion of the Merger and CoD arriving on Game Pass in 2025). We therefore find that at least some benefit from the claimed Game Pass RCB may be expected to accrue within a reasonable period, such that the condition in section 30(3)(a) of the Act is satisfied.

MS splits its customers from Game Pass into 5 different cohorts (page 399)

The Game Pass model splits Microsoft's customers into different cohorts based on current purchasing behaviour, with separate calculations for Xbox and PC customers. The cohorts are:

(a) [REDACTED];

(b) [REDACTED];

(c) [REDACTED];

(d) [REDACTED];

(e) [REDACTED];


Only the addition of ABK content to Game Pass would generate relevant customer benefits (RCBs), and even that one would be below the expectations of MS (page 404)

We have found that the following benefits claimed by Microsoft do not constitute RCBs (and, even if they did meet the necessary conditions, would be small and would not have a material impact on the costs of the prohibition remedy):

(a) The claimed Cloud Gaming RCB;

(b) The claimed Nintendo RCB; and

(c) The claimed Mobile Gaming RCB.

We have found that the claimed Game Pass RCB qualifies as an RCB, and can be expected to have annual benefits materially below the £[REDACTED] million per year figures presented by Microsoft. We have also found that the benefits are likely to decline over time. We have not found it necessary (or possible) to estimate the precise amount of the benefit that may be expected to accrue from the claimed Game Pass RCB, given the inherent uncertainties with this exercise. This is in any case not necessary for us to conduct the proportionality assessment as set out below.

We have also found that even if the claimed Cloud Gaming RCB and claimed Nintendo RCB did constitute RCBs, the scale of the benefits would not be material to our assessment.


MS told the CMA that prohibiting the acquisition would have "huge collateral effects on the way in which Microsoft is able to carry on its business as it wishes to outside the realm of cloud gaming' (page 406)

In its response to our Remedies Working Paper, Microsoft told us that the CMA had 'substantially understated the costs of prohibition', and that other than the RCBs, prohibition would have 'huge collateral effects on the way in which Microsoft is able to carry on its business as it wishes to outside the realm of cloud gaming'.

It added that prohibition would limit Microsoft as to how it would be able to operate in all non-cloud gaming activities where it would be able to use Activision content to pursue its strategic goals. It told us that as the Addendum to the Provisional Findings recognised, there was no basis for competition concerns in relation to these activities and yet Microsoft would be precluded from pursuing legitimate business opportunities. It therefore told us that the proportionality concern could not simply be seen through the prism of provable RCBs: the impact on Microsoft's business freedom was 'very extensive and not justifiable'.


The CMA doesn't consider prohibiting the merger a disproportionate remedy, including the international context and the impact of the decision outside the UK (page 413)

Under section 86(1) of the Act, the CMA is permitted to impose remedies that extend to a person's conduct outside the UK if that person is carrying out business in the UK (as is the case for both Microsoft and Activision).

The Parties themselves accept that the Act allows the CMA to adopt remedies which may have impacts outside the UK. In this case, we have not identified any effective remedy that would avoid extra-territorial effects. We note in this respect that the Microsoft Cloud Remedy (which we have found to be ineffective) would also have had extra-territorial effects, as it would have involved the imposition of regulatory restrictions on the Parties' conduct on a global basis.

Our Merger Remedies Guidance notes that: "Where competition authorities in other jurisdictions are considering a merger which the CMA is also investigating, the CMA will consult with some or all of these authorities to seek consistency and effectiveness in the approach to remedies where relevant."

In this case, we have consulted with other competition authorities, including in the EU and US. However, nothing arising from this consultation changes our view on the appropriate remedy in accordance with our obligations under the Act.

In light of the above, we are satisfied in this case that prohibition is a proportionate remedy that respects the principles of international comity, notwithstanding its extra-territorial effects.
 
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T0kenAussie

Member
Jan 15, 2020
5,093
They did, it was MS that refused the structural remedies during their negotiation time. As CMA did not find MS's final offer satisfactory, they blocked it.
If MS manages to get CAT to get the case back to CMA over some procedural fault or whatever, I guess they can still try suggest a structural remedy this time (although given their current conclusion, perhaps now CMA would only accept MS selling both Activision and Blizzard in favor of King, which would be a huge concession).
Hang on you think a structural remedy of divestment is only a UK affecting solution?
 

BloodHound

Member
Oct 27, 2017
8,999
I disagree. Comcast and ATT have vital infrastructure required to make cloud gaming work- vast cable, fiber, and wireless networks and they'd be able to leverage these networks to gain favorable access to cloud gamers and datacenters. They also both have millions of existing subscribers that they could pack in cloud gaming services to.

Tencent is the largest publisher and would have obvious incentives to use ABK to foreclose competition.

You didn't say that these companies would be looking to do anything cloud related- but there if all things are equal, their should be concerned than them owning a vital cloud gaming input would negatively influence competition in the cloud gaming market.

I'm not sure why MS being vertically integrated is being presented as some monopoly threat. MS owning datacenters does not give them power to prevent competitors from accessing the infrastructure to compete in the market.
GCP, AWS and Azure is fundamentally different than having cables and infra that distribute media and internet. Microsoft has APIs, SDKs and applications outside of just the hardware that these telecoms don't have for cloud computing... not just cloud gaming.

Things are not equal amongst Microsoft and those other suitors and regulators know this.