An interesting question not being discussed in this thread:
https://www.resetera.com/threads/ni...roms-threatens-gaming-history-pc-world.61552/
It's worth pointing out that there aren't any strong economic or artistic reasons for any NES games not to be in the public domain by now.
And they probably would be, if it wasn't for Disney's absurd lobbying.
Recommended watching:
So what isn't really being highlighted in the aforementioned thread, it really shouldn't be illegal for ROM hosting sites to exist. 14 years (the original length of copyright in the US), is more than enough. No company makes risk assements on whether to develop a property based on how much money it could make off resales of the original in 15 years time.
EDIT:
Whilst the following article is opinionated, it does provide an interesting perspective on copyright: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/misinterpreting-copyright.en.html
Paper declaring where 14 years was calculated (with assumptions and ignoring some factors) as optimal length of copyright:
https://rufuspollock.org/papers/optimal_copyright_term.pdf
https://www.resetera.com/threads/ni...roms-threatens-gaming-history-pc-world.61552/
It's worth pointing out that there aren't any strong economic or artistic reasons for any NES games not to be in the public domain by now.
And they probably would be, if it wasn't for Disney's absurd lobbying.
Recommended watching:
So what isn't really being highlighted in the aforementioned thread, it really shouldn't be illegal for ROM hosting sites to exist. 14 years (the original length of copyright in the US), is more than enough. No company makes risk assements on whether to develop a property based on how much money it could make off resales of the original in 15 years time.
EDIT:
Whilst the following article is opinionated, it does provide an interesting perspective on copyright: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/misinterpreting-copyright.en.html
The first error: "striking a balance"
The copyright bargain places the public first: benefit for the reading public is an end in itself; benefits (if any) for publishers are just a means toward that end. Readers' interests and publishers' interests are thus qualitatively unequal in priority. The first step in misinterpreting the purpose of copyright is the elevation of the publishers to the same level of importance as the readers.
It is often said that US copyright law is meant to "strike a balance" between the interests of publishers and readers. Those who cite this interpretation present it as a restatement of the basic position stated in the Constitution; in other words, it is supposed to be equivalent to the copyright bargain.
But the two interpretations are far from equivalent; they are different conceptually, and different in their implications. The balance concept assumes that the readers' and publishers' interests differ in importance only quantitatively, in how much weight we should give them, and in what actions they apply to. The term "stakeholders" is often used to frame the issue in this way; it assumes that all kinds of interest in a policy decision are equally important. This view rejects the qualitative distinction between the readers' and publishers' interests which is at the root of the government's participation in the copyright bargain.
The consequences of this alteration are far-reaching, because the great protection for the public in the copyright bargain—the idea that copyright privileges can be justified only in the name of the readers, never in the name of the publishers—is discarded by the "balance" interpretation. Since the interest of the publishers is regarded as an end in itself, it can justify copyright privileges; in other words, the "balance" concept says that privileges can be justified in the name of someone other than the public.
As a practical matter, the consequence of the "balance" concept is to reverse the burden of justification for changes in copyright law. The copyright bargain places the burden on the publishers to convince the readers to cede certain freedoms. The concept of balance reverses this burden, practically speaking, because there is generally no doubt that publishers will benefit from additional privilege. Unless harm to the readers can be proved, sufficient to "outweigh" this benefit, we are led to conclude that the publishers are entitled to almost any privilege they request.
Since the idea of "striking a balance" between publishers and readers denies the readers the primacy they are entitled to, we must reject it.
Paper declaring where 14 years was calculated (with assumptions and ignoring some factors) as optimal length of copyright:
https://rufuspollock.org/papers/optimal_copyright_term.pdf
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